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# Lessons learned from a large OpenBMC deployment

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Production Engineers

# What is Production Engineering?

- 
- Security
  - Scalability
  - Efficiency
  - Configuration management
  - Upgrades
  - Deployment
  - Performance tuning
  - Disaster readiness
  - Capacity planning
  - Reliability
  - Contingency planning

# What is OpenBMC?

- Open-source Board Management Controller (BMC)
- Yocto/OpenEmbedded Linux distribution
- Linux Foundation



OpenBMC

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# Our OpenBMC deployment

What does the fleet look like?

- 100,000's of OpenBMC devices in production
- 9 different platforms
- ARM v5/v6 single core CPUs
- 256+ MB RAM
- 32 MB SPI NOR Flash
- U-Boot



OpenBMC

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
# Three Stories

(Three Lessons learned)

- Out of Memory in 1 to 60 Days
- The Pain of Passwords
- (Re)Designing for Resilience

Out of Memory in 1 to 60 Days

# Out of Memory in 60 Days





# Out of Memory in 1 Day



# Out of Memory in 1 to 60 Days

## Why to Engage Upstream and Rebase Often

- We've seen three problems:
  - Linux kernel inode cache memory leak in 2.6
  - rsyslog memory leak
  - Lack of log rotation on tmpfs (unbounded max size)

# The Pain of Passwords

# The Pain of Passwords

## Why to Invest In Security

- Setting the BMC's hostname broke pexpect based tools
- Turning off the echo flag fixed it

# The Pain of Passwords

## Why to Invest In Security

- Trusted CA and Authorized Principals are great
  - SSH server configuration is easy
  - CA only contacted when creating/renewing client certificates
  - Group based (not user based)
  - Certificates expire and can be revoked

# Trusted CA and Authorized Principals Example

```
$ ssh-keygen -C CA -f ca
TrustedUserCAKeys /etc/ssh/ca.pub
$ ssh-keygen -t ecdsa # or -t rsa, up to you
$ ssh-keygen -s ca -I cov -n root -V +1w -z 1 id_ecdsa.pub
$ ssh-keygen -lf id_ecdsa-cert.pubid_ecdsa-cert.pub:
Type: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com user certificate
Public key: ECDSA-CERT ...
Signing CA: ECDSA ...
Key ID: "cov"
Serial: 1
Valid: from 2016-01-13T15:26:00 to 2016-01-20T15:27:00
Principals:
  root
Critical Options: (none)
Extensions:
  permit-X11-forwarding
  permit-agent-forwarding
  permit-port-forwarding
  permit-pty
  permit-user-rc
$ ssh root@bmc-oob
Accepted publickey for root from 1.2.3.4 port 123 ssh2: ECDSA-CERT ID cov (serial 1) CA ECDSA fingerprint...
```

# **(Re)Designing for Resilience**

# (Re)Designing for Resilience

- The problem:
  - OpenBMC rsyslog retention began dropping dramatically
  - Coincided with rolling out a new OpenBMC image to one of the platforms



# Upon further investigation

```
root@openbmc:~# cat /var/log/messages | wc -l  
9999
```

```
root@openbmc:~# grep -c 'fscd: Exception with board' \  
/var/log/messages  
5184
```

# (Re)Designing for Resilience


- What happened?
  - New image reformatted persistent storage
  - This deleted cache files that are **only** populated by IPMI messages sent by the host system's BIOS
  - Without the cached files, the error occurs every few seconds for each DIMM of each host (4 \* 4 \* <lots of devices>)

# (Re)Designing for Resilience

- Rebooting all of the hosts isn't an option, so:
  - Construct the DIMM info IPMI message using dmidecode output on the Linux host
  - Send it using ipmitool 😊

# Report DIMM info from the host

```
root@some-host:~# ipmitool raw 0x30 0x1c 0x01 \  
0xc6 0x55 0x08 0x00 0x20 0x00 0x00
```



# (Re)Designing for Resilience

- Can we do better?
  - Manage dependencies (don't depend on one off events)
  - Clear interfaces
  - How do other industries do this?

# Contact

- Christopher Covington: [cov@fb.com](mailto:cov@fb.com)
- Samantha Downs: [sdowns@fb.com](mailto:sdowns@fb.com)
- Links:
  - Linux Foundation repo: <https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc>
  - FB repo: <https://github.com/facebook/openbmc>
  - <https://www.openbmc.org/>
  - <https://code.fb.com/security/scalable-and-secure-access-with-ssh/>

**Questions?**



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